Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

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Abstract

We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.

Original languageEnglish
Article number109247
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume192
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2020

Keywords

  • Alternating-offer bargaining game
  • Bargaining
  • Endogenous commitment
  • History-dependence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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