Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

Zhixian Yu

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247

Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

Zhixian Yu

Department of Finance, Accounting and Economics

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

66 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.

Original language	English
Article number	109247
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	192
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247
Publication status	Published - Jul 2020

Keywords

Alternating-offer bargaining game
Bargaining
Endogenous commitment
History-dependence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247

Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitmentAccepted author manuscript, 747 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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abstract = "We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.",

keywords = "Alternating-offer bargaining game, Bargaining, Endogenous commitment, History-dependence",

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KW - History-dependence

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Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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