Local government official competition and financial analyst forecasts

Like Jiang, Lei Liu, Yetaotao Qiu, Yu Wang, Shafu Zhang

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review


We examine how financial analyst forecasts could be influenced by local political forces. Using Chinese data, we find that financial analysts from brokerage houses controlled by provincial governments issue more optimistic forecasts for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) headquartered in the home province (i.e., home SOEs) than for nonhome SOEs, and this effect is more pronounced for nonhome SOEs located in competing provinces. Our results remain unchanged in a battery of robustness checks. Further, local officials are more likely to enjoy political career advancement when they pressure analysts to issue optimistic forecasts for home SOEs relative to nonhome SOEs from competing provinces.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Financial Management
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2023
Externally publishedYes


  • financial analyst
  • government official competition
  • political influence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • General Economics,Econometrics and Finance


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