Game theory based secure wireless powered D2D communications with cooperative jamming

Zheng Chu, Huan X. Nguyen, Tuan Anh Le, Mehmet Karamanoglu, Duc To, Enver Ever, Fadi Al-Turjman, Adnan Yazici

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a secure wireless powered device-to-device (D2D) communication in the presence of the multiple eavesdroppers, where a smart hybrid base station (BS) in cellular network not only charges for the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. Although the cellular networks share their own spectrum with the D2D underlay network, both of them may not belong to the same service provider. Thus, the D2D transmitter charges for the energy services released by the hybrid BS. We formulate two Stackelberg game formulations to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter with/without energy trading. The associated Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games are derived in terms of closed-form solutions. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 Wireless Days, WD 2017
EditorsHenrique Salgado, Jose Ruela, Luis Pessoa, Filipe Teixeira, Manuel Ricardo, Rui Campos, Ricardo Morla
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages95-98
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781509058563
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 May 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event2017 Wireless Days, WD 2017 - Porto, Portugal
Duration: 29 Mar 201731 Mar 2017

Publication series

Name2017 Wireless Days, WD 2017

Conference

Conference2017 Wireless Days, WD 2017
Country/TerritoryPortugal
CityPorto
Period29/03/1731/03/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

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