R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

Shravan Luckraz

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2011.07.019

R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

Shravan Luckraz

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics China

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2873-2876
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economic Modelling
Volume	28
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2011.07.019
Publication status	Published - Nov 2011

Keywords

Cournot duopoly
Isoelastic demand
R&D spillovers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econmod.2011.07.019

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AB - In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.

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R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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