Abstract
We consider investment decisions in a discrete time, two-stage real option game where firms move sequentially, in the context of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) problem. The value of the option depends on the market structure which we assume to be either a monopoly or a Bertrand differentiated duopoly. We show that, in an equilibrium where no firm invests in the first period, a government intervention, in form of a subsidy, can improve the welfare level.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 101717 |
Journal | Socio-Economic Planning Sciences |
Volume | 90 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2023 |
Keywords
- Common goods
- Decision
- Policy Implications
- Real Options
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
- Management Science and Operations Research