GOVERNMENT FRUGALITY CAMPAIGN AND SOE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE OWNERSHIP

Jingyuan Li, Jiatao Li

Research output: Journal PublicationConference articlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Strategic management research has well recognized the heterogeneous effects of different types of shareholders. However, the implication of having them coexisting in a firm has not been clearly understood. We investigate this question in a context where a government regulation exogenously influenced state shareholders' goal, prompting them to cut the executive salary of their firms. Using data on Chinese listed firms, we find that the government regulation led to a significant decrease in CEO compensation of state-controlled firms. The decrease was attenuated if a firm also has a domestic private blockholder, but accentuated if a firm has a foreign blockholder.

Original languageEnglish
JournalAcademy of Management Proceedings
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Externally publishedYes
Event82nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2022: A Hybrid Experience, AOM 2022 - Seattle, United States
Duration: 5 Aug 20229 Aug 2022

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Information Systems
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Industrial relations

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'GOVERNMENT FRUGALITY CAMPAIGN AND SOE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE OWNERSHIP'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this