TY - GEN
T1 - D2D cooperative communications for disaster management
AU - Chu, Zheng
AU - Nguyen, Huan X.
AU - Tuan, Anh Le
AU - Karamanoglu, Mehmet
AU - Duc, To
AU - Ever, Enver
AU - Al-Turjman, Fadi
AU - Yazici, Adnan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/7/31
Y1 - 2017/7/31
N2 - In this paper, we investigate a disaster management system using D2D cooperative communications. Specifically, we consider two D2D cells, one is in healthy area and the other is in disaster area, where a user equipment (UE) in healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, a cellular base station (BS) shares the spectrum with the UE even though they may belong to different service providers. In return, this UE will have to provide some incentives to the BS by paying prices for causing interference and for trading energy. We formulate these processes as two Stackelberg games, interference pricing and energy trading, where their Stackelberg equilibriums are derived in closed-form solutions. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes. It is shown that the energy trading scheme outperforms the interference pricing scheme in terms of assistance efficiency for the disaster area.
AB - In this paper, we investigate a disaster management system using D2D cooperative communications. Specifically, we consider two D2D cells, one is in healthy area and the other is in disaster area, where a user equipment (UE) in healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, a cellular base station (BS) shares the spectrum with the UE even though they may belong to different service providers. In return, this UE will have to provide some incentives to the BS by paying prices for causing interference and for trading energy. We formulate these processes as two Stackelberg games, interference pricing and energy trading, where their Stackelberg equilibriums are derived in closed-form solutions. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes. It is shown that the energy trading scheme outperforms the interference pricing scheme in terms of assistance efficiency for the disaster area.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85028538180&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/ICT.2017.7998227
DO - 10.1109/ICT.2017.7998227
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85028538180
T3 - Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Telecommunications: Intelligence in Every Form, ICT 2017
BT - Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Telecommunications
A2 - Aghvami, Hamid
A2 - Verikoukis, Christos
A2 - Ellinas, Georgios
A2 - Vassiliou, Vasos
A2 - Kamel, George
A2 - Bellavista, Paolo
A2 - Kolios, Panayiotis
A2 - Chatzinotas, Symeon
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 24th International Conference on Telecommunications, ICT 2017
Y2 - 3 May 2017 through 5 May 2017
ER -