Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Zhixian Yu

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102724

Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We generalise Admati and Perry (1991)’s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in the first few stages or at the deadline. A slight change in the environment can influence the ending time dramatically. Based on that, we discuss the appropriate rewarding distribution.

Original language	English
Article number	102724
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	102
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102724
Publication status	Published - 2022

Keywords

Contribution games
Deadline effect
Reward distribution
Value effect

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102724

Cite this

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title = "Contribution games with asymmetric agents",

abstract = "We generalise Admati and Perry (1991){\textquoteright}s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in the first few stages or at the deadline. A slight change in the environment can influence the ending time dramatically. Based on that, we discuss the appropriate rewarding distribution.",

keywords = "Contribution games, Deadline effect, Reward distribution, Value effect",

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year = "2022",

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AB - We generalise Admati and Perry (1991)’s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in the first few stages or at the deadline. A slight change in the environment can influence the ending time dramatically. Based on that, we discuss the appropriate rewarding distribution.

KW - Contribution games

KW - Deadline effect

KW - Reward distribution

KW - Value effect

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JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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