TY - GEN
T1 - Secrecy rate optimization for a MIMO secrecy channel based on Stackelberg game
AU - Chu, Zheng
AU - Cumanan, Kanapathippillai
AU - Ding, Zhiguo
AU - Johnston, Martin
AU - Le Goff, Stéphane
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 EURASIP.
PY - 2014/11/10
Y1 - 2014/11/10
N2 - In this paper, we consider a multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with a multi-antenna eavesdropper, where a private cooperative jammer is employed to improve the achievable secrecy rate. The legitimate user pays the legitimate transmitter for its secured communication based on the achieved secrecy rate. We first approximate the legitimate transmitter covariance matrix by employing Taylor series expansion, then this secrecy rate problem can be formulated into a Stackelberg game based on a fixed covariance matrix of the transmitter, where the transmitter and the jammer try to maximize their revenues. This secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated into a Stackelberg game where the jammer and the transmitter are the leader and follower of the game, respectively. For the proposed game, Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically derived. Simulation results are provided to show that the revenue functions of the legitimate user and the jammer are concave functions and the Stackelberg equilibrium solution has been validated.
AB - In this paper, we consider a multi-input-multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channel with a multi-antenna eavesdropper, where a private cooperative jammer is employed to improve the achievable secrecy rate. The legitimate user pays the legitimate transmitter for its secured communication based on the achieved secrecy rate. We first approximate the legitimate transmitter covariance matrix by employing Taylor series expansion, then this secrecy rate problem can be formulated into a Stackelberg game based on a fixed covariance matrix of the transmitter, where the transmitter and the jammer try to maximize their revenues. This secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated into a Stackelberg game where the jammer and the transmitter are the leader and follower of the game, respectively. For the proposed game, Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically derived. Simulation results are provided to show that the revenue functions of the legitimate user and the jammer are concave functions and the Stackelberg equilibrium solution has been validated.
KW - MIMO system
KW - Stackelberg game
KW - game theory
KW - physical-layer secrecy
KW - private jammer
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84911941651&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84911941651
T3 - European Signal Processing Conference
SP - 126
EP - 130
BT - 2014 Proceedings of the 22nd European Signal Processing Conference, EUSIPCO 2014
PB - European Signal Processing Conference, EUSIPCO
T2 - 22nd European Signal Processing Conference, EUSIPCO 2014
Y2 - 1 September 2014 through 5 September 2014
ER -