R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2873-2876
Number of pages4
JournalEconomic Modelling
Volume28
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2011
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cournot duopoly
  • Isoelastic demand
  • R&D spillovers

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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