Abstract
In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350-357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122-1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 2873-2876 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | Economic Modelling |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2011 |
Keywords
- Cournot duopoly
- Isoelastic demand
- R&D spillovers
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics