Public governance and executive perks under a weak corporate governance environment

Wei Huang, Zongyan Li, Yu Qin, Shuai Yuan

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We reveal state-led anti-corruption campaigns in China can mitigate excess executive perk consumption facilitated by firms' weak internal control environment. Our findings suggest that public governance can substitute for firm-level governance mechanisms. Since these campaigns enhance the central government's disciplinary power over local state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the above effects are heightened among SOEs controlled by provincial/municipal governments rather than the central government. Irrespective of political connections, non-SOEs are also affected, indicating policy effect spillover to China's private sectors. We explore several underlining mechanisms for these effects, including Communist Party Committee governance, chief executive officer/chairperson dismissal, industry competition, and firm productivity.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Financial Management
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 May 2022

Keywords

  • China
  • anti-corruption
  • internal control
  • perks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

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