On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)510-513
Number of pages4
JournalEconomic Modelling
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013
Externally publishedYes


  • Games of innovation
  • Innovation cycles
  • Open-loop equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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