Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Yee Jiun Yap, Shravan Luckraz, Siew Kian Tey

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)8-18
Number of pages11
JournalEconomic Modelling
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014


  • Cournot duopoly
  • Dynamic game
  • Public good
  • Research and development incentive

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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