Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: Belief change and end-game effect

Jiawei Li, Graham Kendall

Research output: Chapter in Book/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

We develop a novel Bayesian model for the finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that takes into consideration belief change and end-game effect. According to this model, mutual defection is always the Nash equilibrium at any stage of the game, but it is not the only Nash equilibrium under some conditions. The conditions for mutual cooperation to be Nash equilibrium are deduced. It reveals that cooperation can be achieved if both players believe that their opponents are likely to cooperate not only at the current stage but also in future stages. End-game effect cannot be backward induced in repeated games with uncertainty. We illustrate this by analyzing the unexpected hanging paradox.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory
Subtitle of host publicationConference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
EventBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010 - Newport Beach, CA, United States
Duration: 14 May 201016 May 2010

Publication series

NameBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010

Conference

ConferenceBehavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions 2010, BQGT 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNewport Beach, CA
Period14/05/1016/05/10

Keywords

  • belief change
  • end-game effect
  • game theory
  • iterated prisoner's dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Finite iterated prisoner's dilemma revisited: Belief change and end-game effect'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this