Contribution games with asymmetric agents

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We generalise Admati and Perry (1991)’s two-player, alternating contributions model, allowing participants to be asymmetric from two dimensions: 1. one of the players is the deadline player and 2. players receive different rewards on completing the project. In equilibrium, the project either ends in the first few stages or at the deadline. A slight change in the environment can influence the ending time dramatically. Based on that, we discuss the appropriate rewarding distribution.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102724
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2022

Keywords

  • Contribution games
  • Deadline effect
  • Reward distribution
  • Value effect

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

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