Abstract
How cooperation emerges and persists in a population of selfish agents is a fundamental question in evolutionary game theory. The research shows that collective strategies with master-slave mechanism (CSMSM) defeat tit-for-tat and other well-known strategies in spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma. A CSMSM identifies kin members by means of a handshaking mechanism. If the opponent is identified as non-kin, a CSMSM will always defect. Once two CSMSMs meet, they play master and slave roles. A mater defects and a slave cooperates in order to maximize the master’s payoff. CSMSM outperforms non-collective strategies in spatial IPD even if there is only a small cluster of CSMSMs in the population. The existence and performance of CSMSM in spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma suggests that cooperation first appears and persists in a group of collective agents.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 45-56 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | International Journal of Swarm Intelligence Research |
Volume | 12 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Oct 2021 |
Keywords
- Collective Behavior
- Cooperation
- Evolutionary Game Theory
- Handshaking
- Master Slave Mechanism
- Population-Based Algorithm
- Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Simulation
- Spatial Game
- Strategic Interaction
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Computational Theory and Mathematics
- Artificial Intelligence