Board Political Superiority and firm performance variability

Qingfeng Wang, Xingyi Zhang

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This study provides empirical evidence that firms with a higher proportion of board directors who are politically more powerful than their CEOs can significantly reduce stock performance variability, but not on accounting performance variability. Our findings show that among independent (female, non-coopted) directors, only those who are politically more powerful than CEOs are effective in their monitoring role. In our additional tests, we show that our findings are not driven by an endogeneity bias. We find some mechanisms through which politically superior boards can mitigate stock performance variability.

Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal of Finance
Early online date16 Jun 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished Online - 16 Jun 2022

Keywords

  • Board Political Superiority
  • CEO turnover
  • performance variability
  • Political power

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

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