China is the second-largest economy and the largest emitter globally. Understanding the logic behind the Chinese government’s environmental policy-making and resource allocation is therefore critical to improving environmental governance and enhancing social welfare. In this dissertation, I empirically examine the behaviors of local governments in China’s environmental governance system. Chapter 1 investigates the responsiveness of local governments to local pollution from a fiscal budget allocation perspective. Chapter 2 shows how career progression incentives shape local governments’ environmental budget allocation, generating an inverted U-shaped pattern in environmental expenditure over the local Provincial Party Congress cycle. Chapter 3 examines window-dressing behaviors by local governments in urban environmental protection during the National Civilized City campaign. My research reveals that Chinese local governments’ environmental behaviors are jointly shaped by the incentive structure facing local leaders, the decentralized and multitasking nature of the governance system, and local leaders’ career progression concerns. Aligning local officials’ career incentives with local environmental interests may be key to successful environmental policy-making and implementation, but attention must also be paid to preventing window-dressing by local governments. These findings may also shed light on broader questions in environmental governance.
- Fiscal Allocation
- Environmental Governance
- Political Incentives
- China
Fiscal allocation and political incentives: an empirical study of China’s environmental governance
Hu, Z. (Author). 19 Jul 2026
Student thesis: PhD Thesis