The value of blockchain and agricultural supply chain parties' participation confronting random bacteria pollution

In practice, agricultural products' bacteria pollution is frequently reported, how to allocate the pollution cost among the supply chain parties can be challenging yet because bacteria pollution occurs randomly, and the evidence is usually absent. We build a game-theoretic model comprising of two competing suppliers and a powerful retailer. We characterize blockchain's value in identifying the responsible party for bacteria pollution and the supply chain parties' participation incentives. We identify the conditions under which incentive alignment of the supply chain parties to participate in blockchain can be achieved. We find that the powerful retailer and the supplier selling high-quality products are better off in blockchain. However, the supplier selling low-quality products will be better off only when (a) the powerful retailer's brand image improvement is sufficiently significant, or, (b) the powerful retailer's brand image improvement is moderate but supply uncertainty is very significant. We further find that blockchain improves the supply chain's economic sustainability, whereas environmental sustainability is improved when (a) the powerful retailer's brand image improvement is small or (b) the powerful retailer's brand image improvement is moderate but the supply uncertainty is small.