Abstract
In a recent paper Luckraz (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 139:315-335, 2008) develops a differential game model to show that a lack of intellectual property protection can improve economic growth in economies, where large technology gaps prevail. However, this conclusion depends crucially on the fact that the closed-loop equilibrium of the model degenerates to the open-loop equilibrium. This note generalizes the results of Luckraz by formulating a setup in which the closed-loop equilibrium does not degenerate to the open-loop equilibrium of the differential game.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 229-237 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications |
| Volume | 149 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Feb 2011 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
Free Keywords
- Applied differential games
- Closed-loop equilibrium
- Cournot competition
- Research and development (R&D) games
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Control and Optimization
- Applied Mathematics
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