On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game

Shravan Luckraz

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.002

On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game

Shravan Luckraz^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics China

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	510-513
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economic Modelling
Volume	30
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.002
Publication status	Published - Jan 2013

Free Keywords

Games of innovation
Innovation cycles
Open-loop equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.002

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title = "On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R\&D game",

abstract = "This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.",

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AB - This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.

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KW - Innovation cycles

KW - Open-loop equilibrium

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DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.002

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On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game

Abstract

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