Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Yee Jiun Yap; Shravan Luckraz; Siew Kian Tey

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020

Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Yee Jiun Yap, Shravan Luckraz, Siew Kian Tey

Research output: Journal Publication › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	8-18
Number of pages	11
Journal	Economic Modelling
Volume	39
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020
Publication status	Published - Apr 2014

Keywords

Cournot duopoly
Dynamic game
Public good
Research and development incentive

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020

Cite this

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title = "Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly",

abstract = "This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R\&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.",

keywords = "Cournot duopoly, Dynamic game, Public good, Research and development incentive",

author = "Yap, \{Yee Jiun\} and Shravan Luckraz and Tey, \{Siew Kian\}",

note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank two anonymous referees whose suggestions have helped improve the paper substantially. Yee Jiun Yap acknowledges the support of the University of Malaya Research Grant (UMRG) No. RG175-11AFR . ",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020",

language = "English",

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AU - Yap, Yee Jiun

AU - Luckraz, Shravan

AU - Tey, Siew Kian

N1 - Funding Information: We would like to thank two anonymous referees whose suggestions have helped improve the paper substantially. Yee Jiun Yap acknowledges the support of the University of Malaya Research Grant (UMRG) No. RG175-11AFR .

PY - 2014/4

Y1 - 2014/4

N2 - This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.

AB - This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results.

KW - Cournot duopoly

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Public good

KW - Research and development incentive

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84896300240

U2 - 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020

DO - 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84896300240

SN - 0264-9993

VL - 39

SP - 8

EP - 18

JO - Economic Modelling

JF - Economic Modelling

ER -

Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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