Abstract
Strategic management research has well recognized the heterogeneous effects of different types of shareholders. However, the implication of having them coexisting in a firm has not been clearly understood. We investigate this question in a context where a government regulation exogenously influenced state shareholders' goal, prompting them to cut the executive salary of their firms. Using data on Chinese listed firms, we find that the government regulation led to a significant decrease in CEO compensation of state-controlled firms. The decrease was attenuated if a firm also has a domestic private blockholder, but accentuated if a firm has a foreign blockholder.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Academy of Management Proceedings |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 82nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management 2022: A Hybrid Experience, AOM 2022 - Seattle, United States Duration: 5 Aug 2022 → 9 Aug 2022 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Information Systems
- Management of Technology and Innovation
- Industrial relations
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