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Controlling shareholder pledging and corporate ESG behavior

  • Wei Huang
  • , Yan Luo*
  • , Xiaohuan Wang
  • , Lifu Xiao
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Journal PublicationArticlepeer-review

68 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Utilizing a large sample of Chinese listed firms, we document strong and robust evidence that both firms’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and their ESG disclosure quality deteriorate significantly after controlling shareholders’ pledging of their shares for personal loans. The results are especially evident among firms with higher valuation uncertainty, such as small firms and high-tech firms. Lastly, we show that external monitoring by institutional investors helps to mitigate such adverse impacts of controlling shareholder pledging.

Original languageEnglish
Article number101655
JournalResearch in International Business and Finance
Volume61
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2022

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 9 - Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
    SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure

Free Keywords

  • Chinese A-share stock markets
  • Controlling shareholder pledging
  • ESG

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Finance

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