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CEO incentive contracts in China: Why does city location matter?
Alex Bryson, John Forth, Minghai Zhou
School of Economics
Research output
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Journal Publication
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Article
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peer-review
46
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Keyphrases
China
100%
CEO Compensation
100%
Incentive Contract
100%
City Location
100%
State-owned Enterprises
50%
Special Economic Zones
50%
Policy Experiments
50%
Foreign Direct Investment
50%
Privatization
50%
Model Specification
25%
Chinese Cities
25%
Privatization Policy
25%
City Policy
25%
Estimation Model
25%
Estimation Method
25%
Provincial Policy
25%
Ownership Status
25%
Privatization of State-owned Enterprises
25%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Incentives
100%
State-Owned Enterprise
75%
Foreign Investment
50%
Special Economic Zone
50%
Ownership
25%